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A B S T R A C T
Iceland as an island country with abundant renewable energy resources has been totally dependent on imported
petroleum fuels to meet its transport fuel demand. Transition to electric vehicles (EVs) is of particular interest
for Iceland as electricity can be supplied from low-cost renewable energy resources. To evaluate how the transi-
tion to EVs can be achieved through fiscal policy incentives, a dynamic simulation modelling of the integrated
energy-transport system with a detailed representation of energy technologies and vehicle fleets is implemented.
The model is used for a scenario analysis by incorporating key fiscal parameters including different taxes and
subsidies on vehicles and fuels. The fiscal policies to induce EVs, which are applied to both vehicle usage pattern
and upfront purchase cost, include petroleum fuel tax levies, vehicle tax exemption, extra fees and subsidies.
Five fiscal-induced scenarios to promote EVs, including different subsidy and feebate schemes coupled with fuel
tax incentives, are compared with a BAU case. The scenario analysis reveals the impact of different fiscal policy
incentives on consumer decision behaviour and the implications of fiscal-induced EV promotion for vehicle own-
ership costs, government tax revenues/expenditure, and overall economic benefits.
1. Introduction
Transition to a green transport sector utilizing efficient powertrains
and alternative fuels could significantly influence the energy sector and
macro-economic systems. Besides the prospects for technological im-
provements, supportive measures such as fiscal incentives, fuel infra-
structure provision, restriction/regulation strategies, and marketing ef-
forts can be implemented to promote alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs).
Of these factors, the fiscal incentives for fuels and vehicles, notably sub-
sidies and tax levies, primarily affect the adoption and usage pattern of
green vehicles (Brand et al., 2013; Langbroek et al., 2016).
Fiscal instruments for the uptake of AFVs, particularly electric ve-
hicles (EVs), have been adopted in many countries (see e.g. Mock and
Yang (2014) and Zhang et al. (2014) for two comprehensive world-
wide comparison of fiscal incentives for the adoption of EVs). In ad-
dition, a variety of recent studies have investigated the effectiveness
of alternative fiscal policy instruments to promote EVs, taking into
account different perspectives such as consumer choice
behaviour, greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation, macroeconomic costs, and
social benefit (for a brief review see Section 2).
The potential impact of fiscal instruments, in particular, is of great
importance for small economies as they could confront major economic
and social challenges in sustaining their transportation using afford-
able and secure resources and technological options. Iceland is an is-
land country characterized by an isolated energy-system with abundant
renewable energy resources. High dependencies on petroleum fuel im-
ports have left Iceland vulnerable to oil price volatilities and rising GHG
emissions. Transition to renewable fuels has been of particular interest
for Iceland as renewable energy resources such as hydro, geothermal,
and wind enable a significant and affordable potential for fuelling EV
fleets. Hence, the prioritization of technological options, support mea-
sures, and fiscal policies enabling the progress towards a carbon-neutral
transport is essential.
The Icelandic government has introduced incentives such as tax
exemptions and emission-differentiated vehicle taxes to promote the
contribution of green vehicles in the transport sector. Several previ-
ous energy-system studies have addressed the effects of technology
development, fuel supply-push poli
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cies, banning strategies, fuel prices, and carbon tax on the evolution
of AFVs in Iceland. An agent-based modelling study has predicted the
market share evolution of EVs within light-duty vehicle (LDV) fleets
in response to changes in gasoline price, EV purchase cost, recharg-
ing concerns, and excise duty tax (Shafiei et al., 2012). The study only
addressed the competition between conventional gasoline vehicles and
battery electric vehicles (BEV), assuming an exogenous representation
of energy prices and fuel infrastructure. A hybrid agent-based and sys-
tem-dynamics approach evaluated the interactions among consumers,
vehicle market and energy supply infrastructure through a simplified
case study for Iceland (Shafiei et al., 2014b, 2013). A system-dynamics
model of the Icelandic energy system (UniSyD_IS) has been used to com-
pare the potential market share of electric, hydrogen and biofuel vehi-
cles in response to different supply-push strategies (Shafiei et al., 2015a,
2014a) as well as the cost-effectiveness of supporting renewable trans-
port fuels (Shafiei et al., 2015b). The normative approach of Shafiei et
al. (2017a) simulated the trajectories towards a carbon-neutral transport
sector through stringent policies banning petroleum fuel vehicles.
The potential impacts and implications of fiscal instruments have
not been thoroughly explored in Iceland in the context of energy sys-
tem analysis. Fiscal policies in terms of tax and subsidy incentives can
be imposed on both vehicle usage and purchase cost. These incentives
help to overcome the cost disadvantage of EVs with direct short- and
long-term implications for government expenses and consumer costs.
To analyse the economic consequences of integrating EVs within the
Icelandic transport fleet, a dynamic simulation-based analysis is per-
formed using the system-dynamics model of Iceland's energy system
(UniSyD_IS). The UniSyD_IS model enables an effective simulation of in-
teractions among fuel supply, infrastructure expansion, market dynam-
ics, and consumer behaviours. The main objective of this paper is to
compare the macroeconomic cost responses to different fiscal incentives
aimed at promoting EVs. The analysis is aimed at assessing the implica-
tions of different fiscal incentives towards electro-mobility for consumer
costs and government net revenues. The main focus of the scenario sim-
ulations will be on the economic impacts of both upfront cost and vehi-
cle usage incentives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
short review of recent studies focusing on the fiscal-induced promotion
of EVs. In Section 3, an overview of fiscal instruments that are currently
in place in Iceland are presented. The analytical tool and approach is
briefly introduced in Section 4, and the main assumptions on vehicle
costs are given in Section 5. The scenarios are explained in Section 6,
and then the results of the model analysis are discussed in Section 7. Fi-
nally, the conclusions and policy implications are provided in Section 8.
2. Recent studies on fiscal policy analysis of EVs
The scope of the following review focuses on recent studies that
have investigated the effectiveness of alternative fiscal policy instru-
ments to promote EVs. Different studies have been classified into three
main groups: the US studies, the EU studies, and the East Asian studies.
Ross Morrow et al. (2010) applied the National Energy Modelling
System (NEMS) to estimate the energy, economic, and CO⁠2 implications
of different policies from 2010 to 2030 in the US. They studied 16 ve-
hicle technology options, including PHEVs. They concluded that pur-
chase tax credits are ineffective in cutting emissions, while proposing
an additional tax on petroleum fuels will result in the largest reductions
in both CO⁠2 emissions and oil imports, driven by a significant reduc-
tion in annual travel distance. Having focused on the vehicle owner-
ship cost, Tseng et al. (2013) studied five representative vehicle types
(conventional, hybrid with and without plug-in, and electric), and then
concluded that with federal tax incentives, all EV types driven 120,000
miles over 12 years are affordable and the additional lifetime costs com-
pared to conventional vehicles are about 5%.
Lutsey et al. (2015) focused on the effectiveness of various promo-
tion activities in the US cities using statistical models, considering both
fiscal and non-fiscal instruments. Based on an analysis of 25 major U.S.
metropolitan areas, they detected a significant variation in the effective-
ness of promotion activities to advance the adoption of EVs, mainly due
to the size and density of cities.
Focusing on the east Asia, the analysis by Hong et al. (2012) using a
mixed logit model, indicated that annual tax incentives for EVs in South
Korea are twice as effective as an initial lump-sum incentive for pur-
chasing price as the consumer choice probability for EVs would rise by
14% due to tax incentives, compared to 7% for lump-sum incentives.
Later, Hao et al. (2014) investigated the rationale of China's two-phase
EV subsidy scheme and estimated their impacts on the EV market pen-
etration, by estimating the ownership cost of BEVs. Later, Helveston et
al. (2015) have used data from choice-based conjoint surveys fielded in
2012–2013 in China and the U.S. to model consumer preferences for
conventional, HEV, PHEV, and BEV technologies focusing on the im-
pacts of federal subsidies.
Shepherd et al. (2012) have used a system-dynamics approach to as-
sess the impact of subsidies and taxation on the uptake of PHEVs and
BEVs during a 40-year period in the UK. They have evaluated the effec-
tiveness of vehicle subsidies in different scenarios. Brand et al. (2013)
applied the UK Transport Carbon Model to quantify the impacts of fiscal
incentives on passenger car sales and emissions until 2050 in the UK.
The findings concluded that car purchase tax and feebate policies are
the most effective policies in reducing life cycle GHG emissions.
In the case of Austria, Gass et al. (2014) analysed three fiscal policy
scenarios; (i) upfront price support, (ii) CO⁠2 tax, and (iii) tax increase
on fuel for ICE. They have calculated the total ownership costs for ICEV
and EV from 2011 to 2020, based on the survey responses from the main
automobile manufacturers and importers in Austria. The authors argued
that introducing the estimated tax levels for CO⁠2 and fuel consumption
would be less attractive compared to an upfront vehicle price support.
Market share of EV accounted for more than 22% of all new car sales
in Norway in 2015 (ICCT Europe, 2016), confirming that EVs are at-
tractive to consumers when incentives are powerful enough. Figenbaum
et al. (2015) explored possible explanations to the Norwegian develop-
ment considering the incentives given and the attitudes among users.
They found that the current taxation scheme in Norway offers a great
opportunity to influence vehicle purchase, and to compensate for mar-
keting challenges.
Recently, Lévay et al. (2017) focused on the implications of fiscal
incentives on the total cost of ownership, net price, and sales of eight
EV-ICEV pairs in eight European countries using 2014 data. The col-
lected information enlightens that exemptions from registration and an-
nual taxes support big EVs, while initial lump-sum subsidies favour
small EVs.
The presented review provides an overview of the recent studies fo-
cusing on the implication of different policies on the adoption of EVs,
GHG emissions and consumer expenditures in the United States, East
Asia, and Europe. The applied methodologies include system-dynam-
ics, regression models, mixed logit model and choice-based surveys. The
explored policies covered a wide range, including purchase tax credit,
emissions taxes, vehicle registration fees, and tax on conventional fuels.
While many studies have focused on the impact of fiscal incentives
on consumer's behaviour and vehicle ownership costs, the implications
of transitions to EVs in the long-term for government revenues and over-
all macroeconomic benefits from both government and consumer per-
spectives have been less explored. The present research will provide a
broader understanding of the key implications of more detailed fiscal
instrument from both consumer and government aspects. For such pur-
pose, the key fiscal parameters including excise duty tax, value added
tax, weight tax, distance tax, disposal charge, carbon tax and various
fuel taxes will be explored.
3. Fiscal instruments in Iceland
Vehicle and fuel taxation is a key source of tax revenue for the
European countries. While tax rates and fees related to the registra-
tion, ownership and use of cars are diverse across Europe (Kunert and
Kuhfeld, 2007), the generated taxes accounts for up to 5% of the gross
national product (OECD, 2016). In 2016, the collected tax, including ex-
cise duties and value added tax (VAT), on vehicles imported to Iceland
reached 63.7 billion ISK which is 17% higher than 2015 (The Icelandic
Automobile Association, 2016). The key fiscal parameters in the current
analysis are described in the following sections. An average exchange
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3.1. Vehicle tax
Taxes on vehicles include excise duty, value added taxes, and annual
road tax.
3.1.1. Excise duty tax
Most motor vehicles are subject to an excise duty upon import in
Iceland. The excise duty on LDVs is currently based on CO⁠2 emissions
declared by car manufacturers for the combination of city and road dri-
ving as shown in Table 1 (Alþingi, 1993).
Considering the current structure of taxes in Iceland, EVs are ex-
empted from the excise tax. The structure of excise tax is different for
heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs). The excise tax is 30% for small busses that
can carry 10 passengers or less and have total weight less than 5 t, while
if they are owned by companies, the excise tax is 5%. It is zero for trucks
with a total weight above 5 t (Alþingi, 1993). Based on the HDV fleet
composition (ICETRA, 2017), the average excise duty for the HDV fleet
is 0.5%.
3.1.2. Value added tax (VAT)
Currently, the VAT is 24% for all conventional vehicles in Iceland.
Since 2012, there has been a discount of ISK 1.44 million on the VAT
for BEVs, and a discount of up to ISK 0.96 million for PHEVs (Alþingi,
2016).
3.1.3. Weight tax
For vehicles, with a total weight of 3.5 t or less, the weight tax is ISK
11,620 per year for the release of up to 121 g-CO⁠2/km, and ISK 278 per
gram of excess CO⁠2. Considering the registered CO⁠2 emissions for EVs,
their owners only need to pay the minimum road tax (Alþingi, 2016). To
calculate the average weight tax for the fleet, the average weight of LDV
fleet needs to be estimated. Based on the composition of the new regis-
tered vehicles (ICETRA, 2017), the average weight of a LDV is 1.4 t and
the average engine power is 90 kW. Considering the estimated average
weight, the weight tax is ISK 11,620 plus the CO⁠2 emissions dependent
term.
For heavy vehicles (weight exceeding 3.5 t), weight tax is linearly
related to the vehicle weight. Based on the HDV fleet composition, the
average weight of a typical HDV is 9 t, and engine power is 375 kW.
Considering the average weight of HDV fleet, the weight tax is estimated
to be ISK 134,360 per year.
3.1.4. Distance tax
Distance tax which depends on the weight and the annual distances
travelled, is applied only to HDVs with a weight of 10 t or more (Article
13 - Alþingi, 2004). Based on the HDV fleet composition in 2015, 46%
of the fleet is heavier than 10 t and the average weight of heavy vehicles
exceeding 10 t is 12.5 t. In addition, the weight distance tax for HDVs is
ISK 1.6 per km, according to Alþingi (2004). Thus, the distance tax will
be estimated as 0.46 × 1.6 × annual km.
3.1.5. Disposal charge
According to “Iceland: Recycling Fees Act, No. 162/2002″, since Jan-
uary 2003, a disposal charge of ISK 700 is levied on each vehicle annu-
ally (Alþingi, 2002).
3.1.6. Summary of assumptions on vehicle tax
Table 2 provides a summary of the vehicle tax structure in Ice-
land, which is based on our estimations and the literature. The annual
road tax is defined as the total of weight tax, distance tax and disposal
charge.
3.2. Fuel tax
The prices of gasoline and diesel fuels in Iceland have three tax com-
ponents: excise duty tax, VAT and carbon tax charge.
The excise duty tax on gasoline is 70.05 ISK/litre (Alþingi, 2016),
while it is 60.10 ISK/litre for diesel (Alþingi, 2016). A VAT rate of
24% is applied to all fuels including electricity (Alþingi, 2014). The car-
bon tax rates on gasoline and diesel are 5.5 ISK/litre and 6.3 ISK/litre
(Alþingi, 2009), equivalent to $20/tonne-CO2eq.
4. Analytical tools
The energy system model for Iceland (UniSyD_IS) based on the sys-
tem-dynamics approach is used to simulate the implications of transport
fiscal policies during 2015–2050. UniSyD_IS is a partial-equilibrium sys-
tem-dynamics model with a detailed representation of energy resources,
conversion technologies, fuel infrastructure, and vehicle fleets. It is ca-
pable of endogenously simulating the vehicle fleet evolution using the
sector modelling of fuel supply, energy markets, refuelling/recharging
infrastructure, and fuel demand.
The model has been tested with applications in different case studies
and it has been applied to New Zealand and Iceland (see Shafiei et al.
(2017b) for an overview). The model structure is conceptually divided
into four main sub-sectors.
4.1. Energy supply
This sector calculates the amount of fuels that can be supplied at
various market prices and production costs. It incorporates four key
components involving resource supply curves, existing plant capacities,
planned or future capacities, and production costs. The future costs of
renewable resources are modelled using resource supply curves in which
generation cost increases with cumulative production. Besides the im-
ported petroleum fuels, the fuel supply system is modelled from renew-
able energy sources including hydro, geothermal, wind, and waste bio-
mass.
4.2. Refuelling/recharging infrastructure
This sector determines the refuelling station service availability as an
important factor that changes consumer preferences towards AFVs. Sta-
tion profitability is used to represent fuel station viability. A positive gap
between the projected profitability and a desired level of profit leads to
increase the construction rate of new stations (Keith, 2012). Refuelling
stations are assumed to be retired at the end of their lifetime if they are
not profitable due to a lower fuel demand (Shafiei et al., 2016, 2015a).
4.2.1. Vehicle choice and fuel demand
A vehicle choice algorithm forecasts the market share evolution
of different vehicles within LDV and HDV fleets. A multinomial logit
(MNL) framework gives the probability that consumers adopt new vehi-
cles based on their preferences towards vehicles’ attributes. The vehicle
attributes included in the consumer utility function are vehicle purchase
price ($), annual maintenance cost ($/year), fuel cost per kilometre ($/
km), battery replacement cost for EVs ($), vehicle driving range (km),
and refuelling service availability (relative to the conventional petro-
leum fuel infrastructure).
The preferences coefficients in the utility function are calibrated
using basic economic assumptions. In this context, the vehicle pur-
chase price coefficient is calibrated using the elasticity data for the
vehicle demand in Iceland.
Table 1
Excise tax factor based on registered CO⁠2 emissions (Alþingi, 1993).
Group A B C D E F G H I J
Emission level
(g/km)
0–80 81–100 101–120 121–140 141–160 161–180 181–200 201–225 226–250 +250
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Table 2
Vehicle tax structure in Iceland.




% of import price 0–65% 0.5%
Value
added tax















The purchase price coefficient is then used as a scaling factor for estima-
tion of the other preferences coefficients. For more details see (Shafiei
et al., 2014a).
The model adjusts the annual travel demand over time according to
changes in the fuel cost per km. For simplicity and based on available
data in (Dahl, 2012), we have assumed a constant elasticity of −0.33 to
adjust the annual travel demand with respect to changes in the fuel cost
per km. Annual distance travelled, vehicle stock, fuel economy improve-
ment, vehicle technology shifts, and vehicle fuel switching are taken
into consideration in forecasting the total fuel demand.
4.2.2. Energy markets
This sector attempts to balance the demand with the supply curves
of production plants by changing price signals. The algorithm is based
on a market-oriented economic system in which fuel supply viability is
determined by market clearing price and supply profitability (Shafiei et
al., 2015a). In the short term, the energy price signals are transferred
to the corresponding production plants to determine the amount of fuel
supply. In the long-term, the forecasted fuel prices play a crucial role in
the installation of new capacities. For a detailed description of the algo-
rithm see (Shafiei et al., 2015c).
Table 3
Vehicle fleet and powertrain categories.











hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) gasoline ✓ n/a
diesel ✓ ✓








battery electric vehicle (BEV) electricity ✓ n/a
The model is capable of simulating the interactions of around 2000
variables during the time horizon of 2015–2050 with a two-week time
step. While the model is capable of simulating all alternative fuel mar-
kets, the analysis in this paper focuses on the electro-mobility, incorpo-
rating the electricity supply infrastructure and the corresponding vehi-
cle technologies in the demand side.
5. Vehicle choice set
Table 3 shows the classification of fleets and powertrains in the cur-
rent analysis. Vehicle fleets are divided into LDV and HDV vehicles.
LDVs weigh less than 3.5 t and the typical car representing the LDV fleet
in Iceland is modelled assuming an average weight of 1.4 t and the en-
gine power of 90 kW. It is assumed that HDVs weigh more than 3.5 t
with an average weight of 9 t and an average engine power of 375 kW.
Due to existing technological restriction in terms of battery size,
power density, and driving range, BEV is excluded from the HDV appli-
cation (California Environmental Protection Agency, 2015), and PHEV
is the only EV option for HDVs in the current analysis. The use of liquid
biofuels and their blend with petroleum fuels are excluded from the cur-
rent analysis. Only biogas as a renewable fuel, which has been produced
from biomass wastes in Iceland is kept within the fleet composition.
5.1. Vehicle purchase cost
Fig. 1 shows the assumed capital purchase cost of different vehicles
over time. The vehicle purchase costs have been calculated based on the
initial and floor cost data from (Dodds and Ekins, 2014; Mcdowall and
Dodds, 2012) for manufacturing, powertrain, fuel tank, exhaust, chas-
sis and other vehicle components. The fixed components of capital cost
have been scaled according to the assumed average weights of vehicles,
but the powertrain costs have been scaled according to the average en-
gine power of vehicles in Iceland. Technological learning for vehicles is
applied exogenously by assuming a global mass-production level for EVs
by 2030 (Shafiei et al., 2017b).
The key capital cost component of EVs is the size of the battery re-
quirement, which is calculated based on the required driving range. The
specific cost data for different battery sizes during 2015–2030 are pre-
sented in Table 4.
5.2. Vehicle operation and maintenance cost
The annual maintenance costs are displayed in Table 5. The data
for LDVs have been adopted from (EU Coalition Study, 2010) with own
modifications in terms of the annual distances travelled, the exchange
rate, and the cost deflator for Iceland. The corresponding values for
HDVs have been approximated by scaling up the costs of LDVs accord-
ing to the ratio of vehicle weights and annual distances travelled.
The average insurance fees for typical LDVs and HDVs are assumed
as $1025/year and $4100/year, respectively (VIS, 2017). The corre-
sponding annual costs for the vehicle inspection are $102/year and
$162/year (Adalskodun, 2017). An average exchange rate of ISK 117
per US$ is assumed for all calculations.
Fig. 1. Average capital purchase cost of vehicles in 2014 k$/vehicle, excluding tax and subsidies, assuming range values of 300 km for BEV and 60 km for PHEV. The data are based on
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Table 4
Assumptions on the specific battery cost ⁠a.
Battery size (kWh) Specific cost in 2015 ($/kWh) Specific cost beyond 2030 ($/kWh)
low medium high low medium high
10 577 721 866 216 325 433
20 438 547 656 164 246 328
30 372 465 557 139 209 279
40 332 414 497 124 187 249
50 303 379 455 114 171 227
60 281 352 422 106 158 211
a Initial and future data are based on average battery costs in (Bubeck et al., 2016; Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015) with own modifications. The battery size effects are from (Wu et al.,
2015).
Table 5
Annual maintenance cost in $/year, based on data from (EU Coalition Study, 2010) with modifications.
ICE-gasoline ICE-diesel HEV-gasoline HEV-diesel PHEV-gasoline PHEV-diesel BEV
LDV 657 694 657 694 620 655 500
HDV ─ 9251 ─ 9251 ─ 8729 ─
6. Scenarios
Six scenarios are defined, as shown in Table 6, based on different
taxes and subsidies on fuels and vehicles. The BAU scenario reflects
the fiscal policies currently active in Iceland. In this scenario, the ex-
cise duties and VAT are levied on the fuels as explained in Section
3.2. The VAT and excise duties on vehicles are implemented accord-
ing to the assumptions explained in Section 3.1. In the BAU+Tax sce-
nario, further fiscal incentives for EVs in terms of the higher carbon tax
and petroleum excise duties are introduced. It is assumed that the car-
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tonne-CO2eq by 2050. A 100% increase is also assumed for the petro-
leum fuel excise duties by 2050 (i.e., the average annual growth rate of
2% during 2015–2050).
To promote the market introduction of EVs, the Subsidy scenario in-
corporates further incentives to BAU in terms of direct subsidies linked
to the purchase price of BEV and PHEV within both LDV and HDV fleets.
In comparison, the Subsidy+Tax scenario includes both the purchase
price subsidies and the higher carbon tax and petroleum excise duties.
The Feebate scenario is defined as another fiscal policy option to fur-
ther stimulate the uptake of EVs. In this scenario, a fee equivalent to
20% of the conventional ICEV price is imposed on both petroleum ICEVs
and HEVs, which have higher fuel consumption and emissions com-
pared to PHEVs and BEVs. Next, an equivalent rebate value is provided
to the purchase price of light-BEVs and heavy-PHEVs. The Feebate+Tax
scenario makes the Feebate scenario incentives stronger through the
higher excise duty and carbon tax levies on the petroleum fuels.
In all scenarios, the oil price is constant at $50/bbl over the study
period. The presented costs for batteries and vehicles in Fig. 1 and Table
4 are used for a baseline analysis. To incorporate the effects of different
battery characteristics for EVs, additional sensitivity cases are taken into
account as presented in Table 7.
Table 7






based on Table 4
low range - low cost
(LR-LC)
100, 40 lower bound cost
low range - med cost
(LR-MC)
100, 40 medium cost
low range - high cost
(LR-HC)
100, 40 higher bound cost
med range - low cost
(MR-LC)
300, 60 lower bound cost
med range - med cost
(MR-MC)
300, 60 medium cost
med range - high cost
(MR-HC)
300, 60 higher bound cost
high range - low cost
(HR-LC)
500, 80 lower bound cost
high range - med cost
(HR-MC)
500, 80 medium cost
high range - high cost
(HR-HC)
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7. Simulation results
7.1. Vehicle fleet profile
Fig. 2 compares the market share evolution of BEVs and PHEVs
within the LDV and HDV fleets. The vehicle upfront fiscal incentives in
the Subsidy and Feebate scenarios significantly raise the market share of
BEV technology within the LDV fleet, compared to BAU. The results in-
dicate that Feebate is the most effective strategy to promote the market
penetration of BEV. Additional fuel tax incentives in terms of petroleum
fuel excise duties and carbon tax lead to slight increases in the market
share of BEV in all scenarios, substituting mainly for HEVs. The petro-
leum fuel tax incentives will not influence the share of PHEV within the
LDV fleet. The reason is that PHEV has a dual-fuel capability that the
assumed range of 60 km for the electric driving mode accounts for 65%
of daily distance travelled. Since the vehicle rebate incentives taking ef-
fect in the Feebate scenario are only allocated to BEVs, a lower market
penetration of PHEV is observed compared to the Subsidy scenario.
The share of PHEV within the HDV fleet is highly influenced by dif-
ferent scenario assumptions as it is the only EV technology assumed for
HDVs. The market share of heavy PHEVs, unlike LDV's, is sensitive to
the fuel tax incentives due to a lower contribution of the electric driving
range in total distance travelled.
7.2. Government net revenues
Fig. 3 compares the government tax revenues and subsidies in dif-
ferent scenarios. The vehicle upfront tax revenues, composed of vehicle
excise duty and vehicle purchase VAT, show decreasing patterns in all
scenarios due to assuming the emission-differentiated tax duties as well
as the VAT exemptions for EVs as explained in Section 3.1. It implies
that the higher share of EVs by stronger fiscal incentives reduces the
government income from vehicle purchase tax levies.
The fuel excise duty is reduced by 25%, 32%, and 38% over the pe-
riod in BAU, Subsidy, and Feebate, respectively, in accordance with the
reduction of demand for petroleum fuels. The inclusion of fuel tax incen-
tives in BAU+Tax and Subsidy+Tax, enhances the fuel excise tax rev-
enues slightly by 19% and 10%. The fuel excise tax is not changed in the
Feebate+Tax scenario because additional petroleum excise duty is offset
by the significant reduction of 48% in petroleum fuel use by 2050. As-
suming a substantial rise in the carbon tax in BAU+Tax, Subsidy+Tax,
and Feebate+Tax leads to the carbon tax contributions of 15%, 21%,
and 17% in total net government revenue by 2050.
The vehicle road tax slightly decreases in all scenarios due to the
transition to a lower emission fleet and losing the emission-dependent
component of the road tax revenues as explained in Section 3.1. The fuel
VAT revenue in the scenarios with vehicle purchase incentives (BAU,
Subsidy, and Feebate) is reduced slightly due to changes in the fuel de-
mand. However, a minor growth in the fuel VAT revenue is expected
for the other three scenarios with fuel tax incentives as the VAT rate is
applied to all components of fuel prices (i.e., fuel cost, excise tax, and
carbon tax).
Under the Subsidy and Subsidy+Tax scenarios, the government di-
rect subsidies on EVs account for 33% and 27% of gross government
revenues by 2050. Under Feebate and Feebate+Tax, additional vehicle
purchase fees applied to petroleum ICEVs and HEVs bring significant in-
come for the government during the initial years of the simulation pe-
riod. It gradually declines over time as EVs are adopted, which in turn
boost the subsidies in terms of the EV rebates as defined in Table 6. In
the Feebate scenario, the extra purchase fee will be superior to subsidies
(rebate) until the year 2040 where all fees should be rebated to the con-
sumers who adopt EVs. Thereafter, the government needs to supplement
its income from the fees to cover the rebate expenses. Under the Fee-
bate+Tax scenario, the balance between fee and rebate will occur ear-
lier at 2035. It leads to 17% reduction in the vehicle fee revenues and
18% growth in the rebate expenses by 2050, compared to the Feebate
scenario.
Fig. 4 compares the overall net tax revenues from fuels and vehi-
cles. As shown in the left chart of Fig. 4, introducing fiscal incentives for
the vehicle upfront cost makes the fuel tax revenue component slightly
worse than BAU in line with the reduction of petroleum fuel consump-
tion. Simulating the impact of rising carbon tax and fuel excise duty in-
centives indicates that a growth of at least 80% in the fuel tax revenue
would be expected in all scenarios by 2050.
The middle chart in Fig. 4 shows that the tax revenues from vehi-
cle purchase is decreasing over time in all cases. Under BAU, the tax
shrinkage of 45% is forecasted during the study horizon. Under the Fee-
bate-dependent scenarios, while the government could benefit from the
excess revenues from the petroleum vehicle fees during 2015–2030, a
sharp drop in the net revenues is expected by 2050 to compensate for
the rebate expanses. Under the Subsidy-dependent scenarios, it is envis-
aged that the government will lose all of its net revenues from the ve-
hicle taxation by 2050 as all of the related revenues should be spent on
the EV subsidies.
The right chart in Fig. 4 reveals the overall tax revenues including
the fuel and vehicle taxes as well as the annual road tax revenues. The
main implication of the simulation results is that the fuel tax incentives
in all scenarios make significant increase in the overall tax revenues.
The supplementary fuel tax in the BAU+Tax scenario could preserve
the overall government revenue at its initial level. Under Subsidy and
Feebate, the fuel tax incentives make the overall tax revenues approach
the BAU trend in the long-term. It implies that the carbon tax and petro-
leum excise duties can be effective fiscal instruments to compensate for
the lost tax revenues in all scenarios.
7.3. Consumer vehicle ownership cost
Fig. 5 presents the simulated patterns for the consumer fuel cost (in-
cluding the cost of petroleum fuels and electricity as well as fuel taxes),
the vehicle purchase cost (including the vehicle taxes and subsidies),
and the total vehicle ownership cost (including the fuel cost, vehicle
purchase cost, maintenance cost, and the costs of inspection and insur-
ance).
The vehicle upfront capital incentives in the Subsidy and Feebate
cases result in the minor fuel cost reductions of 5% and 8% by 2050,
compared to BAU. By contrast, the fuel tax incentives, in terms of higher
carbon tax and petroleum excise duty, increase the consumer fuel cost
by 34–37% in different cases.
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Fig. 3. Structure of government revenues and expenditures in different scenarios.
Fig. 4. Comparison of net government revenues from fuels and vehicles in different scenarios (Note: different scales on the charts).
The vehicle purchase cost component is mostly influenced by the
vehicle purchase incentive policies. The Subsidy-dependent scenarios
represent the lowest vehicle purchase cost from a consumer perspec-
tive by a reduction of 13% compared to BAU by 2050. Because of
imposing extra fees on the petro
leum vehicles, the Feebate-dependent scenarios initially entail an ex-
tra vehicle purchase cost of 18% compared to the BAU case. Ow-
ing to the market penetration of EVs, the government rebates grad-
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Fig. 5. Comparison of consumer vehicle ownership costs in different scenarios (Note: different scales on the charts).
hicle fees, leading to a downward trend toward the below of the BAU
level by 2040.
From an overall vehicle ownership cost, the Subsidy scenario would
be the most attractive strategy, leading to the lowest ownership cost.
BAU+Tax would be the most expensive scenario in the long-term. The
forecasted trends for total vehicle ownership cost in the other scenarios
converge to, relatively, the same value.
7.4. Overall economic benefits
The economic benefits in the current analysis are evaluated from
three perspectives: i) government benefit, ii) consumer benefit, and iii)
overall consumer and government benefits. The net benefit is calculated
as the difference in total consumer cost and net government revenue be-
tween each scenario and the BAU case.
The percentage changes in net benefits of different scenarios are il-
lustrated in Fig. 6. The consumer benefits due to different fiscal poli-
cies move inversely to the government net benefits. While BAU+Tax
is superior from the government perspective by the net benefit of 35%
(M$180/year) in 2050, it will result in a consumer loss of 7% (M$167/
year). Conversely, while the Subsidy scenario brings the greatest benefit
of +7% (M$183/year) for consumers, it leads to a major government
loss of 42% (M$210/year) by 2050 compared to BAU.
To estimate the overall consumer and government benefit, the gov-
ernment net tax revenues are deducted from the total consumer costs,
and then the resulting values are compared to BAU.
In all scenarios, the fuel tax incentives improve the government ben-
efit and worsen the consumer benefits by a large amount. However,
from an overall view, the fuel tax incentives get the overall consumer
and government benefits slightly promoted. The changes in the overall
benefits reflect the economic effects of the market share development of
EVs in different scenarios.
To evaluate the trade-off between government and consumer bene-
fits, further analysis is presented as shown in Table 8. The BAU+Tax
policy that raises
the cumulative discounted government revenue (compared to BAU and
assuming a 7% discount rate) makes the consumer cost worse off. To
generate $1 of revenue for the government, the consumer cost increases
by $0.95, which is shown by a negative value in Table 8. Raising $1 ad-
ditional government revenue in the Feebate and Feebate+Tax scenarios
leads to the consumer losses of $2.33 and $1.7, respectively. In the Sub-
sidy and Subsidy+Tax cases, the government revenue loss of $1 (due to
direct subsidies) makes the consumer benefits of $0.66 and $0.55, re-
spectively. The resultant effect of government revenue change on con-
sumer benefit depends on the overall interaction between tax/subsidies
and consumers’ behavioural change (i.e. travel demand, shift to alterna-
tive powertrains, and fuel switching).
To evaluate the magnitude of loss and benefits compared to the
absence of fiscal incentives, further comparative analysis is performed
as illustrated in Fig. 7. For each scenario, a reference case is defined.
For the associate reference case to each scenario, no fiscal policy inter-
vention occurs to promote EVs, and similar tax mechanisms are imple-
mented for both conventional and alternative fuel vehicles. However,
each reference case resembles the results of its associated scenario, pro-
ducing the same market shares for all vehicles over time. It has been
achieved by implementing exogenous constraints in the market pene-
tration of vehicles assuming equal-taxation mechanisms for all vehicles
in the reference cases. All reference cases assume a VAT rate of 24%
on all vehicle types. Instead of emission-differentiated excise tax duties
on vehicles, the constant rates of 30% and 0.5% are levied on LDVs
and HDVs, respectively. The fuel taxation remains as the same as BAU.
The simulation results show that all government losses are totally trans-
formed into consumer gains. The overall benefit is zero for all scenarios
as similar vehicle market structure is assumed for each scenario and its
associated reference situation.
7.5. Effectiveness and efficiency of policies
Different fiscal policies to promote EVs can be compared in terms
of effectiveness and efficiency. The market share of EVs within the
vehicle fleets and
Fig. 6. Net economic benefits compared to BAU (Note: different scales on the charts).
Table 8
Consumer net benefit to government net revenue ratio.
BAU+Tax Subsidy Subsidy+Tax Feebate Feebate+Tax
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Fig. 7. Economic benefit/loss compared to the reference cases with lack of fiscal incentives (Note: different scales on the charts).
the level of GHG mitigation provide simple proxies for the policy ef-
fectiveness. The efficiency analysis evaluates the economic efficiency
of policies in terms of total or specific costs associated with transi-
tion processes. Total net transition cost and GHG mitigation cost (in $/
tonne-CO2eq) represent the efficiency of policies in this analysis. Ac-
cording to Fig. 8, the Feebate+Tax and Subsidy+Tax scenarios are the
most effective strategies in GHG mitigation (or petroleum fuel use sav-
ing), and the Subsidy scenario is the least effective policy option. How-
ever, the efficiency analysis from the total transition cost perspective
indicates that BAU+Tax is the best economically-efficient scenario fol-
lowed by Subsiy+Tax. Conversely, Feebate is the worst policy option in
terms of cost-efficiency.
Performing a pairwise comparative analysis between the scenarios
showed that the fuel tax incentives improve both the cost-efficiency and
effectiveness of policies. It means that, as shown in Fig. 8, the inclusion
of fuel tax incentives in BAU+Tax, Subsidy+Tax, and Feebate+Tax im-
proves both the economic benefits and the GHG mitigation, compared
to BAU, Subsidy and Feebate, respectively. However, in a multiple com-
parison considering all scenarios, there are conflicts between efficiency
and effectiveness measures. For example, in the Feebate+Tax scenario,
enhancing the policy effectiveness (i.e. higher GHG mitigation) is ex-
pected to occur at a higher transition cost (i.e. less efficiency). By incor-
porating cumulative discounted cost and cumulative GHG mitigation,
the cost-effectiveness of GHG mitigation is calculated. According to Fig.
8, the BAU+Tax and Subsidy+Tax policies exhibit the best cost-effec-
tiveness at reducing each tonne of CO2-eq. The Subsidy scenario falls in
the least cost-effective option.
7.6. Sensitivity analysis
To evaluate the sensitivity of main findings with respect to assump-
tions on battery cost and battery driving range, further analyses are per-
formed based on the cases defined in Table 7. Fig. 9 shows the impact of
battery cost and driving range assumptions on the share of electricity in
total transport fuel demand by 2050. This figure reveals the overall mar-
ket penetration and usage effects of BEV and PHEV within both LDVs
and HDVs. In general, the following important points can be deducted
from Fig. 9:
i) The more fiscal incentives, the higher the share of electricity will be
in the total fuel demand.
ii) At a certain level of battery range, the share of electricity is im-
proved by battery cost reduction.
iii) The low range value assumptions (i.e., LR-HC, LR-MC, LR-HC) lead
to the lowest electricity share in total demand.
iv) Although the results indicate that a medium battery range would be
the most economically attractive option for BEV for LDVs, however,
by taking into account the effects of PHEVs within both LDVs and
HDVs, the higher battery range values give a higher share of elec-
tricity in total fuel demand.
Fig. 10 displays the sensitivity of government and consumer ben-
efits (compared to BAU) with respect to the assumptions on the cost
of batteries and driving range as explained in Table 7. Similar to the
analysis in Fig. 6, the per
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Fig. 9. Impact of battery cost and driving range assumptions on the share of electricity in
total transport fuel demand by 2050.
centage changes have been calculated by comparing each sensitivity
case to its corresponding case in the BAU condition. The resulting pat-
terns for different sensitivity cases conform to the overall effects of elec-
tricity share (as shown in Fig. 9) and battery cost/range assumptions. In
general, the following important findings can be concluded:
i) When battery range is low (i.e., LR-HC, LR-MC, LR-HC), higher gov-
ernment benefit is forecasted in all scenarios because of lower elec-
tricity share in total demand. By contrast, the cases linked to the
low cost with higher battery range values (i.e. MR-LC and HR-LC)
are most advantageous for the consumers.
ii) Net benefits in BAU+Tax shows the lowest variations with the sen-
sitivity assumptions, mainly due to the small differences in the mar-
ket share of EVs compared to BAU.
iii) In the Subsidy scenario, the government benefit is sensitive, to a
small extent, when a low battery range assumption is chosen.
iv) In the Subsidy+Tax scenario, the government benefit increases with
range reduction (electricity market share effect) and battery cost re-
duction (lower subsidy effects).
v) Subsidy+Tax and Feebate+Tax scenarios are largely influenced by
the battery range and cost assumptions. Low range values largely
improve the government benefit in these scenarios. Because of the
small share of EVs and the lower amount of subsidy requirement in
these cases, the government losses diminish sharply after 2030.
vi) The Feebate and Feebate+Tax scenarios are largely sensitive to the
higher values of range and cost (i.e. HR-HC, MR-HC and HR-MC) to
enhance the government benefit mainly due to a lower contribution
of BEV within the LDV fleet. Conversely, the government loss will
be highest in the cases with the low cost and higher battery range
values (i.e. MR-LC and HR-LC which give the consumers the best
advantage). From a consumer perspective, the vehicle capital-inten-
sive case of HR-HC would be at a disadvantage.
vii) The overall net benefits (government and consumers) will be minus-
cule (less than 1%) in the BAU+Tax scenario. The other scenarios
show negative overall benefits, albeit with improving trends over
time for most of the cases. In the Feebate-dependent scenarios, the
cases coupled with the higher range and cost values (i.e., HR-HC
and HR-MC), which are costly to consumers, aggravates the overall
benefit from 2040.
8. Conclusions and policy implications
The potential impact of fiscal policy instruments is of great im-
portance for Iceland as a small economy, which could face challenges
in sustaining green and affordable transport services with long-term
economic gains. A dynamic simulation model of the integrated en-
ergy-transport system was employed to assess the implications of fis-
cal-induced promotion of EVs for government and consumer costs in
Iceland. In this context, incentives for both upfront cost and vehi-
cle usage were taken into consideration. Vehicle purchase VAT, ve-
hicle excise duty, extra purchase fees, and purchase subsidy are the
main fiscal factors assumed for the upfront purchase cost of vehi-
cles. From the vehicle usage per
spective, the assumed fiscal policy parameters are carbon tax, petroleum
fuel excise duties, fuel VAT, and annual road tax.
The analysis compared five scenarios aimed at inducing EV mar-
kets through the provision of different fiscal incentives with a BAU sce-
nario assuming the current fiscal policies. The fiscal incentives for ve-
hicle purchase price were introduced as price subsidy for EVs and fee-
bate scheme, which includes extra fees for petroleum fuel vehicles and
rebates for EV price. The fiscal incentives from the vehicle usage per-
spective include higher levels of petroleum excise duty and carbon tax.
Various sensitivity cases were then defined within each scenario to eval-
uate the findings with respect to changes in the cost and driving range
characteristics of batteries for EVs.
The simulation results confirmed that providing vehicle upfront cost
incentives would be a more effective strategy, compared to vehicle us-
age tax incentives, to promote the market penetration of EVs within
both LDVs and HDVs. The vehicle usage tax incentives, in terms of pe-
troleum fuel excise duties and carbon tax, can slightly enhance the mar-
ket for light-BEV and heavy-PHEV. These incentives will not influence
the share of light-PHEV due to the competition with BEVs.
The contribution of electricity in total transport fuel demand, which
reveals the overall market penetration and usage effects of BEV and
PHEV within both LDVs and HDVs, is significantly affected by both fis-
cal-induced polices and characteristics of EVs (i.e., battery cost and dri-
ving range). Following the BAU condition, the share of electricity in the
fuel demand by 2050 will be within the span of 7–13%, depending on
battery range and cost value assumptions. The supplementary fuel tax
incentives in BAU raise this share span to 9–16%. The EV price sub-
sidy strategy would be more effective in stimulating PHEVs, rather than
BEVs, leading to the electricity share span of 10–18% by 2050. How-
ever, the EV price subsidy together with the fuel tax incentives favours
BEV, giving a higher electricity share of 12–21% in the fuel demand.
Both the feebate schemes, without and with fuel tax incentives, favour
light-BEV and heavy-PHEV, and lead to the electricity share spans of
13–22% and 16–26%, respectively, by 2050. From a vehicle stock per-
spective, the maximum market share of 40% for both light-BEV and
heavy-PHEV can be achieved by 2050 through the implementation of
the feebate scheme with fuel tax incentives. The corresponding value for
light-PHEV is estimated as 53% under the subsidy-related fiscal incen-
tives.
In terms of GHG mitigation, the subsidy and feebate scenarios cou-
pled with fuel tax incentives show the most effectiveness while the sub-
sidy scenario is the least effective policy option in reducing GHG emis-
sions. The petroleum fuel tax incentives improve both the GHG mitiga-
tion and the cost-effectiveness of fiscal policies in emissions reduction.
The BAU and subsidy scenarios coupled with fuel taxes show the best
cost-effectiveness at reducing each tonne of CO⁠2-eq. The subsidy sce-
nario falls in the least cost-effective option.
The findings indicate that continuing the current fiscal policy
scheme under the BAU scenario leads to a government tax revenue
shrinkage of 28–35% during the study horizon, depending on different
assumptions on battery cost and driving range. The implementation of
the fiscal policies taking into account the fuel tax incentives makes large
increases in the government tax revenues from fuels, slight decreases in
the tax revenues from vehicle purchases, and significant improvement
in the overall government tax revenues from the transport sector. Under
the current BAU condition, the fuel tax incentives could help to rela-
tively preserve the current government revenues over time. Comparing
to BAU, the fuel tax incentives are identified as effective fiscal policy in-
struments to compensate for the lost tax revenues due to the uptake of
EVs in all scenarios. Particularly, to minimize the government losses un-
der the subsidy and feebate schemes, compared to the BAU trend, these
strategies should be coupled with the fuel tax incentives, which large
petroleum fuel excise duty and carbon tax levies will be required.
The consumer economic preferences in different fiscal-induced EV
promotion policies exhibited inverse patterns to those of government
benefits. From the consumers’ perspective, the EVs’ price subsidy policy
would be most advantageous because of a higher market share potential
for EVs coupled with a lower vehicle ownership cost. Conversely, a sole
fuel tax incentive scheme added to BAU would be the most expensive
strategy from the consumer views as a minor market share development
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Fig. 10. Impact of battery cost and driving range assumptions on government and consumer benefit compared to BAU (Note: different scales on the charts).
The findings from an overall consumer and government perspective,
which reveals the economic effects of the market share development of
EVs, showed that only BAU with fuel tax incentives could make a pos-
itive balance, albeit with a lower market share potential for EVs. The
other scenarios, which give higher shares of EVs, exhibited negative
overall balances, although with improving trends over time. Incorporat-
ing the fuel tax incentives are identified as useful policy instruments to
promote the overall economic benefits in all scenarios.
The analysis showed different response patterns to changes in bat-
tery cost and driving range assumptions. Thus, it is important to con-
sider these dependencies when implications of different fiscal policies
are evaluated. The results showed high sensitivities when lower bat-
tery range values are assumed. In general, lower battery ranges favour
government due to a lower revenue loss, especially in the feebate
and subsidy scenarios with supplementary fuel tax incentives. Medium
and higher battery range values when battery cost is low favour con-
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cases representing higher driving range values when battery cost is high
would be at a disadvantage.
Finally, the presented study provides a broad understanding of the
key implications of detailed fiscal instruments from both consumer and
government aspects. The comparative analysis provides important in-
sights into energy and transport planning for transition towards EVs in
Iceland with the aim of utilizing indigenous renewable energy sources.
By investigating a broad range of options, the results can inform pol-
icy-makers on the implications and potential costs/benefits of fiscal poli-
cies aimed at supporting EVs. However, it should be noted that the eco-
nomic costs/benefits from both government and consumer perspectives
do not necessarily reflect the priority or advantage of each scenario as
they have been estimated based on different levels of EV promotion and
GHG mitigation. If specific goals or targets had been set for the GHG
mitigation, then the least-cost strategy satisfying the goals would have
determined the preferred policy. Since the resulting effectiveness lev-
els are different, there are conflicts between efficiency and effectiveness
measures and both criteria could not be fully satisfied. In this frame-
work, which there is no specific target or goal to be satisfied, the cost-ef-
fectiveness of GHG mitigation could be a useful measure to compare
the scenarios. However, future works in our research agenda would be
designing a multi-criteria decision analysis framework to incorporate a
broader range of factors to prioritize different policy options. In addi-
tion, since the tax levies or subsidies in reality are dependent on spe-
cific vehicle attributes (e.g., weight, engine capacity, fuel economy, pur-
pose of use, etc), further breaking down the vehicles into more detailed
sub-categories would improve the accuracy of results.
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